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 Considering the passage of GAO Bid 
Protest Reforms in the FY 2018 NDAA, what 
is the potential effect on protests of DoD 
contract awards?
 Are there other policy options that the 
government should consider outside of the 
FY 2018 NDAA recommendations?
 If so, how would these alternatives alter the 
protest process and to make it easier for 




 Number of DoD protests at GAO have 
doubled since from 2001-2015
 Little data shows the cost of filing protests to 
businesses or government
 Key RAND Corporation recommendations
 Enhance the quality of post-award 
debriefings
 Consider implementing an expedited 
process for adjudicating protests involving 
contracts valued under $0.1 million
Current Trends-
FY 2018 NDAA
 2 year pilot program requiring 
businesses to reimburse DoD for 
costs incurred in processing 
covered protests:
 Protests denied by GAO
 Filed by a party with over $250 
million in annual revenues
 RAND found that 0.3% of 
contracts are protested and 
most are on small contracts
 No definition of “cost incurred”
Source; congress.gov
Methodology
 472 GAO closed docket 
protest for the previous 
year in three agencies:
 Defense Logistics 
Agency
 Navy Supply Systems 
Command
 Army Material 
Command
 Cross-referenced 
solicitation numbers with 
FBO’s “Value at Time of 
Award”
 159 solicitations 
contained “Value at 




Agency Number of 
Protests with 
“Value at Time 
of Award” 
Average “Value 













 Inflated Army Material Command 
Center values
 Multiple large protests on singular 
solicitation
 34 protests regarding one 
$500,000,000 contract
Results
 31 of 159 “Value at Time of 
Award” protests denied: 88 of 472 
total
 Most contracts would not be 










Criteria and Policy Alternatives
Criteria
 Decrease the number of contract 
protests presented to GAO
 Increase potential new business 
partners with DoD
 Save the government money and 
time 
Policy Alternatives
 Make “losers pay” pilot program in 
FY 2018 NDAA permanent law
 Funnel all DoD protests regarding 
a singular solicitation into one 
review
 Eliminate GAO’s role in 
adjudicating bid protests
Score Explanation
0 Fails to satisfy criterion
1 Partially satisfies criterion
2 Fully satisfies criterion
Alternative 1: Make “losers pay” pilot program in 















0 0 1 1
Alternative 2: Funnel all protests for one solicitation 















2 1 2 5





























Losers Pay Law 0 0 1 1
Funnel All 
Protests
2 1 2 5
Eliminate GAO’s 
Role
0 0 1 1
Thank you  Jack Z. Chutchian jzc6@duke.edu
